Was the Assassination of Osama Bin Laden Legal

Officials described secret legal considerations and memos for a forthcoming book on national security policy under Mr. Obama. Most spoke on condition of anonymity because the conversations were confidential. Of course, there are reports that the Pakistani government was indeed informed of the raid, but it preferred to secretly accept the United States so as not to irritate the Pakistani public: Declan Walsh, “Osama bin Laden Mission Agreed in Secret 10 Years ago by US and Pakistan,” The Guardian, London, May 9, 2011, Available on m.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/09/osama-bin-laden-us-pakistan-deal?cat=world&type=article. On this possibility, see also Chris Allbritton and Rebecca Conway, “Analysis: In Pakistan, Embarrassed Silence on Killing,” Reuters, New York, 2 May 2011, available at www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-binladen-silence-idUSTRE7414GF20110502. Although the authors, as outsiders, are unable to judge the veracity of such reports, they do not seem very logical: either the US regards Pakistan as a reliable partner it can trust, in which case bin Laden could have been arrested in a concerted effort by Pakistani and US forces. probably even earlier. or the United States is concerned that the Pakistani state or part of its security services collaborate with al-Qaeda and therefore prefers to act on its own without informing the Pakistani authorities. In our view, the latter scenario better corresponds to the actual operation, and it is very likely that the United States acted without informing the Pakistani authorities, thereby violating Pakistan`s sovereignty. For Pakistan`s agreement to previous US military operations on its territory, see Murphy (No. 85) 118ff.

and Van Schaack (No. 85) (“The approval of the measures in FATA, however, would not necessarily extend to the attack on bin Laden”). According to a draft report by the Pentagon`s inspector general, Admiral William McRaven, commander-in-chief of special operations, ordered the Department of Defense to delete all files related to the bin Laden raid from its computer systems after sending them to the CIA. [181] [182] [183] [184] Any reference to this decision has been deleted from the final version of the Inspector General`s report. [182] According to the Pentagon, this was done to protect the identity of the Navy SEALs involved in the raid. [182] The legal justification for transferring the files is that the SEALs were actually working for the CIA at the time of the raid, supposedly meaning that all the files for the raid belong to the CIA. [181] [182] “Documents related to the raid were handled in a manner consistent with the fact that the operation was conducted under the direction of the CIA director,” CIA agency spokesman Preston Golson said in an emailed statement. “Recordings of a CIA operation such as the (bin Laden) raid created during the conduct of the operation by individuals acting under the authority of the CIA Director are CIA recordings.” [185] Golson stated that it was absolutely false that documents were turned over to the CIA in order to circumvent the legal requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. [185] The National Security Archives criticized this maneuver, saying the files have now entered a “FOIA black hole”: The context for Professor Carter`s comment was a January 25 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding a summary decision.

v. Judicial Watch. The organization demanded the publication of five legal opinions prepared by various government lawyers on the attack on bin Laden. Carter said the decision “seems” to be the correct interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act. After bin Laden`s death, some Bush administration officials, such as former Bush Office of Counsel lawyer John Yoo,[302][303] and former Attorney General Michael Mukasey,[304][305] wrote comments explaining that the enhanced interrogation techniques they allowed (now legally clarified as torture) provided the information that later led to Bin Laden`s hideout. [306] [307] Mukasey said Khalid Sheikh Mohammed`s waterboarding prompted him to reveal the nickname of bin Laden`s letter. [308] Was it legal for U.S. forces to enter Pakistani territory without clear permission from Islamabad? 149 To that effect, see also David Scheffer, former United States Special Envoy for War Crimes, available at inthearena.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/11/did-the-u-s-violate-international-law-by-killing-bin-laden-david-scheffer-former-u-s-amb-at-large-for-war-crimes-issues-weighs-in. The reactions to the reports of Osama bin Laden`s death have been manifold: shock, relief, joy, prudence, elation, restraint. Not surprisingly, an intense debate quickly arose about the legality of Osama bin Laden`s assassination. Critics – including the authors of the article “Has Justice Been Done”? The legality of bin Laden`s assassination under international law,” Kai Ambos and Josef Alkatout – raise many interesting and challenging questions.

This argument is intended to respond to the arguments put forward by Ambos and Alkatout. This article argues that the killing of Osama bin Laden was legal under international humanitarian law. Specifically, careful legal analysis shows that there is a non-international armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. The evidence provides overwhelming evidence that al-Qaeda is an organized armed group within the meaning of international humanitarian law. Osama bin Laden could be considered a strategic commander of al-Qaeda. It has been actively involved in the planning and coordination of armed attacks against military and civilian targets for years, including the recent planning of attacks marking the tenth anniversary of 11 September. As such, it is clearly covered by international law. After all, under international law, the United States had every right to launch an attack on bin Laden in Pakistan.

4 For other terms used (“precision warfare,” “surgical strikes,” “targeted prevention,” “targeted assassinations,” “one-off assassinations,” “smart bombs,” “extreme precision,” “ranged punishment,” and “firepower removed”), see Ben-Ari, Eyal, “Between Violence and Restraint: Human Rights, Humanitarian Considerations, and the Israeli Military in the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” in van Baarda, Ted and Verweij, Désirée (eds.), The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare, Combating Terrorism, Democratic Values and Military Ethics (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 231, 241-42Google Scholar.